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SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS IN CIVIL,
CRIMINAL, AND SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan†
Settlement is more likely if parties are free to set its terms,
including a promise that these terms will remain secret be-
tween them.  State sunshine-in-litigation laws work to defeat
this incentive for confidentiality in order to protect third parties
from otherwise unknown hazards.  The intuition is that a
wrongdoer should not be able to pay one plaintiff for silence at
the expense of other victims.  This Article begins by showing
that the intuition is often wrong or overstated.  A plaintiff who
can assess a defendant’s vulnerability to future claims can
extract a large enough settlement to provide substantial deter-
rence, and at a much lower cost to the legal system.  The
argument does not transfer well to most criminal cases, where
the defendant might pay, not to avoid other claims, but to
avoid incarceration, which offers no direct benefit to the set-
tling victim.  It is further complicated in sexual assault cases,
where the plaintiff might settle too quickly in order to protect
her privacy.  The discussion works toward the idea that in
some settings semi-confidentiality—the disclosure of the sub-
stance of settlement but not the magnitude of monetary pay-
ments—is superior to both secrecy and transparency.  The
right amount of confidentiality is a function of the parties’
interest in privacy, the likelihood that the wrongdoing is part
of a pattern unknown to the settling plaintiff, and the accuracy
of the litigation process that settlement seeks to bypass.  We
are able to identify cases where law ought to allow (even)
criminal cases to be settled privately and confidentially, and
also cases where even sexual assault victims should be
steered away from confidential settlement and toward
translucency.
† Saul Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor at
the University of Chicago Law School; Frank Fagan is Associate Professor of Law,
EDHEC Business School, France.  We are grateful for comments offered by
Anthony Casey, William Hubbard, Lior Strahilevitz, and Alex Weber, and for sug-
gestions received at the 2017 American Law and Economics Association Annual
Meeting, and the faculty workshops at the University of Chicago, UC Davis, and
EDHEC.
311
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 2 24-JAN-18 10:54
312 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:311
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 R
I. IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
OF CIVIL LAWSUITS?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 R
A. Deterrence and the Price of Confidentiality . . . . 314 R
B. Pattern Recognition and Confidentiality . . . . . . . 322 R
II. PRIVATE SETTLING OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING . . . . . . . . . 323 R
III. FALSE CLAIMS AND MORAL HAZARDS: CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 R
IV. SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES AND UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY
PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 R
V. BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY . . . . . . . 339 R
A. Translucency in Civil Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 R
B. Translucency for Misdemeanors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 R
C. The Translucency Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 R
VI. TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL: PATTERNS, PRIVACY, AND
ADJUDICATION ACCURACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 R
INTRODUCTION
To the extent that law is a public good, settlements—and
for that matter any failure to pursue legitimate claims to trial
and then all the way through an appeals process—are troub-
ling.  On the one hand, settlements and private arbitration pro-
ceedings can save costs, and so long as they are reached in the
shadow of the law, they can accomplish most of what law aims
to do.  There is ample evidence that law not only respects par-
ties’ liberty to settle disputes but also encourages settlement.1
Where it does not, it must recognize that parties can often come
to an agreement before any legal claim is filed, and thus pre-
empt law’s involvement.  Either way, settlements deprive the
world of information that judicial decisions might convey, and,
where settlement is secret, third parties may not even know of
hazards or facts that are known to the settling parties but
costly for others to rediscover.2  Put this way, a part of our
conclusion is already foreshadowed: it is sensible for law to
allow some private settlements, but it is also prudent to put
some constraints on confidentiality.  But there is a counter-
vailing factor.  When a party seeks to settle a matter in confi-
1 See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and
Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221,
257–58 (1999).
2 For the classic and wild position against settlement, in favor of more and
more due process and judicial decisions, and by implication against turning the
other cheek, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984).
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dence, its counterparty can often extract a price that serves
third-party interests.  This novel point suggests that there are
cases where law, counterintuitively, ought to allow or even wel-
come confidential agreements to settle disputes—even where
the matter arises because one of the parties is a serious and
repeat wrongdoer.  Deterrence may be obtained in place of sun-
shine as a disinfectant.  Information is valuable, to be sure, but
the higher price a party pays for secrecy might deter misbehav-
ior as successfully as any legal remedy, and the latter normally
comes at a greater social cost.  For example, this Article argues
that an employer who catches an embezzling employee might
be allowed to accept payments from the employee in return for
not calling in the police.  Similarly, but less controversially, an
injured party can and should often be able to extract a larger
settlement from a tortfeasor in return for confidentiality.
Where a state’s “sunshine-in-litigation law” stands in the way,3
it ought to be modified to provide for semi-confidentiality, or
revelation of the subject matter but not the precise terms of
settlement.  A much harder question is whether the accused
party in a university’s sexual assault disciplinary case ought to
be able to bargain with the accuser to avoid the risk of expul-
sion from the university.  When does a case belong to the vic-
tim, and how might a victim’s ability to extract payment for
confidentiality advance the goals of the legal system?
A useful thought experiment is to imagine and compare
legal systems that choose among the following rules: (1) the
frequency and confidentiality of settlement, including arbitra-
tion proceedings, is entirely in the litigants’ hands; (2) confi-
dentiality is restricted by courts or by statutory sunshine (in
litigation) laws that require revelation of obvious hazards, like
dangerous consumer products and intentional wrongdoers;
and (3) nonpublic dispute resolution is permitted, but taxed—
perhaps by legislating that payments made as part of com-
pletely confidential settlements are nondeductible.  Finally,
though the list could be longer, there is the possibility that (4)
confidentiality is normally respected as to the amount of a
settlement but not its subject matter.  The first two of these
options are prevalent, but this Article suggests that the last
two—one presently unknown and the other barely seen4—are
likely superior.
3 Florida was the first of some twenty states to prohibit confidentiality agree-
ments that bring about the concealment of public hazards “that [have] caused and
[are] likely to cause injury.”  FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2016).
4 See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 4 24-JAN-18 10:54
314 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:311
Part I develops the idea that confidentiality can promote
deterrence, and that state sunshine-in-litigation laws may be
misguided.  Part II considers whether confidentiality can ever
be desirable in criminal matters where the criminal might pay
the victim to avoid incarceration.  Part III assesses the problem
of false claims when victims are paid for confidentiality and can
therefore collect more than their losses.  Part IV then applies
the insights about deterrence and false claims to sexual as-
sault cases decided on university campuses under the rules
encouraged by the Department of Education.  The discussion
then turns in Part V to the advantages of semi-confidentiality.
Third-party interests might be served even as wrongdoers are
somewhat deterred by paying for translucency—secrecy with
respect to the amount of a settlement but transparency as to its
substance.  Part VI generalizes the problem and describes the
parameters of an optimal confidentiality rule.
I
IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
OF CIVIL LAWSUITS?
A. Deterrence and the Price of Confidentiality
Why do defendants often seek confidentiality?  At first
blush it seems that a wrongdoing defendant and a willing, self-
interested, knowledgeable plaintiff can collude to keep valuable
information from other victims, and in the process compromise
the deterrence function of law.  In the case where a wrongdoer
is a tortfeasor who may have injured a number of victims, a
promise of confidentiality elicited from one settling victim
might allow this defendant to continue to misbehave; the
wrongdoer is under-deterred because, by hypothesis, similarly
situated victims will not know that they can bring suits.  The
straightforward idea is that the public ought to know of dan-
gers, and defendants must be deterred from repeat wrongdo-
ing.  The prospect of imitative, multiple lawsuits or judicially
supervised class actions serves this purpose.
Note that the presence of a disadvantaged, ill-informed
third party is not normally enough to bar confidentiality.  The
same defendant might also have breached a contract with a
vendor, and then negotiated a payment to avoid suit by the
disappointed vendor.  Other vendors may benefit from knowl-
edge of this breach and settlement,5 but there is no require-
5 We call it a settlement whether or not it was preceded by the formal filing of
a claim for breach of contract.
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ment of disclosure.  If the breaching party fears some
reputational loss, it can ask for a confidentiality clause.  Courts
will respect and facilitate this agreement; if the vendor is found
to have revealed the terms of settlement after agreeing to confi-
dentiality, it may be forced by the terms of the clause to dis-
gorge some or all of the compensation it received for the
contractual breach.6  Such confidentiality agreements are more
common in tort cases than in contract cases, but in both set-
tings courts will likely refer to the “public policy favoring settle-
ments.”7  This policy is supported by the commonly-held view
that trials are expensive and hardly free of error.8
When settlement involves filed tort claims, some jurisdic-
tions bar confidentiality if it will cover up information that is
likely to help other people avoid serious injury.9  Possible modi-
fication of these sunshine-in-litigation statutes is discussed in
Parts IV and V.  The statutes might also be motivated by the
fear that likely defendants will know they can settle claims
confidentially and therefore be under-deterred from taking
proper precautions in the first place.
Closer analysis shows, however, that the connection be-
tween confidential settlements and the deterrence of antisocial
behavior is more complicated.  Confidentiality may, counterin-
tuitively, enhance deterrence, or at least be inconsequential.
Imagine, for example, that consumer A is injured by manufac-
6 See, e.g., Gulliver Sch., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So. 3d 1045, 1046–48 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the breach of a settlement’s confidentiality provision
requires partial disgorgement of the settlement proceeds).
7 Hinshaw v. Super. Ct., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 791, 796 (1996).  More generally, a
presumption of liberty to contract allows a seller to make an offer conditional on
confidentiality even though third parties suffer increased search costs.
8 See Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements:
Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 255, 256–57
(2009) (“Litigation can resolve the respective rights of the parties in an authorita-
tive manner.  But it is costly and risky.”); Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of
the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1939 (1997) (discussing how the
negative public perception of civil jury trials—that such trials are unpredictable,
expensive, and tend to either overcompensate or undercompensate plaintiffs—
has led to the decline of the civil jury trial).
9 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122(a) (West 2017) (providing that con-
tracts or agreements that prohibit the disclosure of environmental hazards violate
public policy and are not enforceable); FLA. STAT. § 69.081(3)–(4) (2016) (prohibit-
ing courts from entering orders or judgments that conceal public hazards and
providing that contracts or agreements that prohibit the disclosure of public
hazards violate public policy and are not enforceable); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 1426(D) (2017) (providing that contracts or agreements that prohibit the
disclosure of public hazards violate public policy and are not enforceable); WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.611(4)(b) (2017) (providing that confidentially provisions are
subject to a balancing test that must consider the potential risk of public
hazards).
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turer M’s product, and suffers a loss of 100.  A claims that the
product was defective.  There is the likelihood that 999 other
consumers are similarly injured.  An open trial pitting A
against M, or a transparent settlement between the parties, will
enable these other victims to bring claims against M.  M’s total
liability will be 100,000, an accurate reflection of the harm
caused by M and, ex ante, the right amount to guarantee that
M, and other manufacturers, will be properly deterred in the
first place.  Absent information about the A-M lawsuit and set-
tlement, these other injured consumers may not know that
their injuries were caused by M’s product or they may not know
that the product is defective.  The former seems plausible
where, for example, a drug produced by M engenders a side
effect that is not generally known to be associated with M’s
drug.10  M is therefore eager to attach a confidentiality clause
to the settlement with A in order to avoid further liability of
99,900.  Confidentiality in this case seems socially
undesirable.
The preceding analysis, with its conventional conclusion,
ignores A’s likely behavior, or bargaining ability, once A per-
ceives that M values confidentiality.  A, or A’s experienced at-
torney, should in principle demand close to 100,000 in return
for the confidentiality clause.  If A can extract that entire bene-
fit from M, then M is properly deterred, just as if M expected to
pay damages to all 1000 injured consumers.11  Indeed, the
confidentiality provision may even be socially efficient because
it obviates numerous lawsuits between M and other victims.
To be sure, these other victims, who by hypothesis do not know
to sue M, go uncompensated and may waste resources search-
10 In principle, adverse side effects must be reported under 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.80 (regulating post-marketing reporting of adverse drug experiences).  How-
ever, reporting depends on the ability of patients and physicians to draw a con-
nection between a side effect and the drug, and then some determination that the
reported incident is plausibly traced to the drug.  When a company fails to report
an adverse drug experience (such as when it secretly settles a case), the FDA will
pursue advisory action (such as issuing a warning letter), judicial action (includ-
ing injunctions, civil damages, and criminal prosecutions), or administrative ac-
tion (such as withdrawing drug approval or barring the company from submitting
any future drug applications). See Stuart L. Friedel & Joseph A. Sena Jr., Pharma
Challenges: Adverse Event Reporting and Social Media, BNA (Oct. 26, 2012),
https://www.bna.com/pharma-challenges-adverse-event-reporting-and-social-
media/ [https://perma.cc/9Z59-QN3R].
11 More precisely, knowing that A or another plaintiff will extract such a
payment for confidentiality, encourages M to take greater precautions at the
outset.  M knows that it is costly to pay out 1000 claims, but it can be just as
costly to pay one claim enhanced by a huge premium for the confidentiality
thought necessary to suppress the other claims.  M will take into account the
probability of at least one informed plaintiff filing suit.
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ing for the source of their injuries.  But the central point is that
a confidential agreement between M and A surely does not
entirely let M escape the consequences of its actions, and may
even deter M just as well as any other tort-and-settlement re-
gime.  The key element here is that A perceives the value of
confidentiality to M, and can extract roughly the same total
payments M would have paid to other injured parties with good
claims.
There are alternatives to the A-M settlement with a large
premium for confidentiality.  First, as already noted, the law
might simply bar confidentiality.  In some cases, A will refuse to
settle without receiving a premium for confidentiality, and then
A’s public suit against M will stimulate many other individual
suits.  In other cases, however, M will be under-deterred, and
perhaps entirely so, because plaintiffs like A face high legal
costs and because M’s wrongdoing is difficult to uncover.12
Alternatively, the legal system might favor a class action; A
and A’s attorney might succeed in serving as the class repre-
sentative.  In many situations this creates an inefficient race to
be the first to file suit.  Even if A discovers the connection
between A’s injury and M, once A files, other attorneys can seek
to represent other members of the putative class.  The process
of assembling a class action is inconsistent with
confidentiality.
A third approach is to allow A to recover the entire amount
of M’s gain from misbehavior, if that is substantial, or the en-
tire amount of damages suffered by A and the 999 other vic-
tims.  This remedy, drawn from the law of restitution and
unjust enrichment, is not unlike one that allows A to extract a
confidentiality premium from M, but it puts courts in the posi-
tion of assessing the aggregate damage done by M or the benefit
provided by A.  Neither scheme necessarily creates a moral
hazard; A is over-compensated, but A may not know in advance
the connection between the other victims’ injuries and M.  That
each victim can file likely creates an inefficient race, the way
the promise of a patent can create duplicative efforts among
inventors,13 but again inasmuch as the task here is to en-
courage someone to uncover the connection between injuries
12 See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Secrecy and
Safety, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1074, 1074 (2005) (providing a model where firms
reduce product safety over time when wrongdoing remains secret).
13 On the inefficiency of patent law races, see Brian D. Wright, The Economics
of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
691, 693–700 (1983).
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and M’s behavior, and to deter M in the first instance, there is
less of a risk of duplication.14
Finally, law could bar confidential settlements but reward
A on a case-by-case basis, assessing the work A put into the
search for the cause of A’s (and others’) injuries, and deploying
a multiplier to offset the probability of failure.  Courts are un-
likely to be adept at the necessary calculations.  Comparable
rewards are used for salvage and rescue in admiralty law, but
in that setting, factfinders can over time observe the state of the
salvage industry.  It would be far more difficult to calculate the
risks that A assumes in searching for the cause of injury, and
to know whether there is substantial over- or under-
investment.
We leave for another day a complete analysis of these alter-
natives.  For the purpose of this Article, it is enough to see that
there are situations where A can extract a payment from M in
return for confidentiality; where this premium can serve to de-
ter M; and where this premium will not generate either a signif-
icant moral hazard or an inefficient race to be the first to file or
extract.  It is the method that promises the lowest legal costs
and that leaves the least room for error in the legal system.  To
be sure, A’s settlement is jarring because it does not provide
compensation to the other 999 persons who remain in the dark
about the source of their injuries.  Nor is there a guarantee that
A will guess correctly the amount of M’s exposure, and thus
extract an amount that provides proper deterrence.  An ideal-
ized class action, as well as some other alternatives, can do
better on these fronts.  On the other hand, class actions and
the other alternatives come with enormous legal costs.  Our
aim is to show that the deterrence value of confidential settle-
ments has been under-appreciated, and then to explore the
implications of this insight.
There are several important deficiencies in this optimistic
story, and these shortcomings may explain why judicial deci-
sions, legislative histories, and academic commentary have
failed to notice or come to grips with this defense of confidential
settlements.  A, and even M, cannot be certain that other vic-
tims require the information provided by the settlement.  Confi-
dentiality is worth less to M (and therefore to A) the more other
14 Consider, too, that A and other victims cannot be sure that they are the
first who have approached M—or that M will pay a premium for confidentiality.
While the deterrence effect of secret settlements will decrease as knowledge of
similarly-situated victims decreases, so does duplicative effort in chasing secrecy
premiums.
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claimants will discover M’s legal vulnerability without knowl-
edge of the A-M settlement.  If, for example, G is injured be-
cause of a toy made by T, it is hard to see how other injured
families require knowledge of the G-T agreement in order to
identify T as the cause of their losses.  The source of a child’s
injury will be obvious.  In the wake of another child’s injury,
that family will easily develop a theory of the case resembling
that which brought G to file a claim and then to settle with T.
Potential claimants probably still gain something from knowl-
edge of a G-T settlement; the dollar amount of that settlement,
combined with information they may be able to obtain about
the severity of G’s injuries, reveals something about T’s eager-
ness to avoid trial or T’s prediction as to whether its toy will be
found defective.  To the extent that these arguments suggest
that confidential settlements are at times poor substitutes for
trials, they also show that confidentiality may not be terribly
valuable to M.  In turn, legal intervention against confidential
agreements in these circumstances is of little value.
In other cases, as where A is convinced that his automobile
malfunctioned and caused an accident, it is more likely that
confidentiality is of value to M.  Confidentiality will prevent
wasteful strike suits from other consumers and lower M’s
costs—especially when A is unable to assess the extent to
which the malfunction is a one-off event or something that
other consumers would wish to know.15  On the other hand, if
the malfunction is real and widespread, M can take precaution-
ary steps going forward—and M knows that other injuries will
generate other plaintiffs.  There is probably a spectrum across
which confidentiality is more valuable to M as other claimants
gain more from knowledge of an A-M settlement.  It might be
appropriate to say that there is an information asymmetry driv-
ing M’s preference for confidentiality, but this deemphasizes
both A’s ability to extract value from the better-informed M as
that asymmetry narrows, and the likelihood that such settle-
ments come close to deterring M in reasonable fashion.
Even where confidentiality is very valuable to M, the par-
ties will not normally know how many claims like A’s are forth-
coming.  A might have enough data to estimate that M faces
15 Public agreements reveal information that can be leveraged in future strike
suit negotiations, including a party’s propensity to settle.  Although defendants
can discourage strike suits by litigating more often, pursuing this strategy is
wasteful.  Note that secrecy and a settlement with A might also keep other con-
sumers from duplicating A’s investigation and litigation costs, but again the ques-
tion at this point in the discussion is whether A can extract, from M, a large part of
the value of secrecy.
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100,000 in liability because of the likelihood of side effects from
its drug, but when A tries to extract something close to this
sum in return for A’s promise of silence, M will reason that
there are a number of people in A’s situation, and M must find
it worthwhile to buy silence from all of them.  M might pay up to
9000 to each of ten knowledgeable victims in return for confi-
dentiality, but M will not pay much more than that, and A (and
even perhaps M) does not know how many ways the pot must
be divided in negotiations with M.  Significantly—though again
surprisingly absent from the settlement literature—is the ob-
servation that a confidentiality clause loses value when M is
paying off a number of victims.  The clause will provide that if A
breaks the agreement, A must return the settlement amount,
and courts can be expected to uphold this contract.16  But
what if both A and B independently extract settlements from M
by agreeing to confidentiality, and then B blurts?  B certainly
forfeits his settlement, but it is unlikely that A will have agreed
to a settlement that requires A to refund her settlement if B
breaks his agreement with M.  We have not seen such an agree-
ment, calling for the return of settlement money when another
party breaches a separate confidentiality agreement, and if
there were such a contract, it is possible that courts would not
enforce it against A.  Moreover, as M divides the gains from
confidentiality among several informed plaintiffs, like A and B,
each has diminished financial incentive to uphold the confi-
dentiality agreement.  Again, this makes confidentiality less
valuable to M, and therefore to all the parties.  In turn, it be-
comes less clear whether payments for confidentiality provide
the same deterrence as those required in numerous lawsuits or
in a class action on behalf of those similarly situated to A.
Sunshine laws or refusals to enforce confidentiality agreements
can thus be understood as means of ensuring the appropriate
level of deterrence.  Of course, if M would rather go to trial than
settle transparently, then the overall effect may be to discour-
age settlement.  In turn, deterrence is a function of plaintiffs’
ability to get to court and prevail in trials.
Although sunshine-in-litigation laws appear to be moti-
vated by the fear that confidentiality will allow M to harm new
victims, the better case for transparency is probably based on
the second idea noted above: the level of deterrence.  It seems
unlikely that even with confidentiality M will continue to manu-
16 Note that M might collude with B to blurt when M no longer values the
confidentiality agreed to by A.  Courts might take this into account when evaluat-
ing confidentiality agreements.
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facture dangerous products or allow them to continue to circu-
late, because every future injury creates a new claimant who
may trace the problem to M without knowledge of A’s lawsuit or
settlement.  In most cases, once M is informed of a hazard
because of a lawsuit filed by A, M will evaluate the risk and,
when appropriate, alter its product, issue a recall, or at least
warn potential victims, because the precaution is less expen-
sive than potential liability from further injuries that might be
avoided.  There are two kinds of cases in which this optimism is
unsupported.  The first is where M thinks that no one but A will
see the connection A has made between the injury and M.  Side
effects of a pharmaceutical seem like the best example, al-
though as a practical matter M is obligated by statute to report
side effects and bad outcomes that come to its attention, and
the penalty for noncompliant secrecy is high.17
The second category is where M does not believe that it has
made a defective product,18 or that A’s injury truly derives from
M’s product, but M fears that news of A’s claim will bring forth
other claimants who also, but incorrectly, trace their injuries,
real or imagined, to M.  In these cases, M may settle with A
because M fears irrationality and error within the legal system.
M may also fear a disproportionate cost to its reputation.
Thus, imagine a case in which A claims a side effect from a
vaccine or from power lines made or installed by M even though
there is overwhelming scientific evidence against the causal
link claimed by A.  M might pay A, subject to a confidentiality
agreement, even though M thinks the claim baseless.
17 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2016) (detailing the Food and Drug Administration’s
reporting requirements for adverse reactions to approved drugs).  Depending on
the circumstances of the reporting, the FDA might issue a warning at its discre-
tion, or pursue legal action.  Alternatively, a third party can take legal action.  For
example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer initiated a civil suit under state
consumer protection laws against GlaxoSmithKline for allegedly failing to disclose
studies regarding the side effects of the drug Paxil, leading to fines of $3 billion.
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to
Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, OFFICE OF PUB. AF-
FAIRS NEWS (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-
plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report
[https://perma.cc/5JND-P3YX]; Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo
Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-bil
lion-in-fraud-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/7J49-VHXF].
18 Even if M thinks there is a defect, it might be of the kind that does not
appear in all identical products.  A few items on an assembly line might suffer
from metal fatigue, or develop cracks, while the others are just fine.
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B. Pattern Recognition and Confidentiality
In some cases the plaintiff is at a bargaining disadvantage
because it is difficult to assess the defendant’s exposure.  Imag-
ine that a celebrity, C, sexually assaults W.  W brings a civil
suit19 and C offers a settlement conditional on confidentiality.
W does not know whether the value of a confidentiality agree-
ment derives from the potential loss to C’s reputation or
whether C also has reason to fear that other complainants will
come forward once they learn that their own experiences might
be part of a pattern of sexual misbehavior.  In contrast, A, the
conventional tort victim, was able to assess M’s exposure by
analyzing its sales volume and bargaining for a confidential
settlement that approaches the full deterrence value of claims
against M in a transparent world.  But W knows comparatively
less than A, and C surely knows more about the existence of
other complainants than does his accuser, W.  The accused
celebrity, C, might reason that others do not want to suffer the
costs of coming forward if their chances of success are low.  C,
however, knows that if a number of women come forward, each
is more likely to be believed, and consequently they will suffer
lower costs.  In short, W can extract some payment from C, but
without information about whether C is in fact a serial wrong-
doer, W is often unable to extract a high settlement.  In turn, C,
and others like him, is insufficiently deterred.
The preceding intuitions about deterrence and pattern rec-
ognition are encouraged by asking what law’s response is and
should be to private settlements of claims where there is no
special pattern problem.  In the civil context, one-off cases do
not normally cause defendants to offer anything for confidenti-
ality.  Setting aside cases where there is a privacy interest, it is
the pattern potential that makes the information valuable to
others and costly to the settling party.  In criminal cases, and
perhaps with respect to most intentional torts, there is more of
a sense of bad types and good types.  The legal system gathers
information about prior arrests and convictions because it
finds the information useful; private settlements may be partic-
ularly undesirable.
19 The lack of evidence may have convinced W that no criminal prosecution
would succeed.  Alternatively, the statute of limitations for a criminal suit, but not
for a civil suit, may have been tolled.
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II
PRIVATE SETTLING OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING
Imagine that a storekeeper, S, suffers an armed robbery at
the hands of AR.  S is prepared to call the police and show
incontrovertible video evidence, but AR, discovering that the
robbery was filmed by a hidden camera, contacts S or even
returns to discuss matters and offers $5000 to settle the matter
if S will agree to complete confidentiality.  Most legal systems
assign a monopoly power over criminal law to the state, so that
the nascent criminal complaint might not seem like something
that S can settle, but it can be difficult for the state to learn of a
crime or to obtain a conviction without S’s (uncompensated)
cooperation and then testimony at trial.  As a matter of legal
doctrine, if S extracts a payment much greater than the value
of what AR has taken, S runs a risk, albeit more in theory than
in practice, that she will be open to a charge of extortion for
having taken more than her “claim of right” allowed.20  The
doctrine seems aimed at cases where the victim of a theft
tracks down the thief and repossesses her belongings.  If the
victim enters the thief’s property, for instance, the former can-
not take for herself as many things as she likes, and if she does
so she is a thief or robber herself.
In practice, if the armed robber and storekeeper bargain for
a payment in return for a confidentiality agreement, law’s prob-
lem is more likely to be the under-deterrence of the robber than
the storekeeper’s enrichment or “crime” of extortion, and espe-
cially so if AR initiates the bargain.  Put in terms of deterrence,
S’s ability to extract a settlement from AR is thought to be
insufficient to deter AR in optimal fashion inasmuch as S does
not internalize the cost of future robberies by AR.  This feature
of criminal or intentional wrongdoing is not new.  In the legal
code found in Exodus, both intentional wrongs and negligence
generate remedies, but only the penalties set down for negli-
20 See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Robbery, Attempted
Robbery, or Assault to Commit Robbery, as Affected by the Intent to Collect or
Secure Debt or Claim, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1309, § 4[a] (1978) (noting that when acting
within a claim of right, the one who takes lacks the intent to steal).  The discus-
sion here assumes that the same is true for extortion rather than behavior that
looks like a robbery.  A criminal claim against S seems especially unlikely where
AR initiates the private bargain, as it become hard to describe S as an extortionist.
Finally, if AR promises future payment, or S accepts payment and then later
decides to report AR to the police, there is the question of whether law will enforce
the AR-S contract.  It is easy to imagine a refusal to enforce, as refusal falls far
short of labeling S a criminal.  On the other hand, nonenforcement in the event of
breach rewards S, though it is likely to deter a subset of these private settlements
in the future.
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gence are described as avoidable through settlement between
the private parties.21  For example, when an ox that was known
by its owner to have gored and caused injury on a previous
occasion gores again and kills a human, the penalty applied to
the owner who failed to restrain his animal is severe, but the
family of the victim could accept monetary payment in lieu of
the remedy provided by law.22  Similarly, in Hammurabi’s
Code, when a doctor negligently injured or killed a patient, the
legislated “eye for an eye” approach was apparently and widely
avoided by negotiated payment.23  In contrast, we have no tex-
tual statement or evidence that robbery or murder could be
privately settled under those early codes.  Those wrongs are
regarded as crimes against the community, and that label may
capture the idea that a criminal is likely to strike again, while
the mistakes made by a builder or owner of oxen are one-off
events.  An alternative explanation is that the builder and oxen
owner are thought to be deterred by monetary payments, while
intentional wrongdoers are more often thought to be out of
control and undeterrable except by removal from the commu-
nity.  Both distinctions track the idea that an injured party and
alleged tortfeasor, like A and M, can settle their tort suits,
perhaps secretly yet still in the shadow of the legal system, but
the robber and storekeeper should not.
Another way to think of the matter is that the modern
legislature has decided to deter and punish the robber with
incarceration rather than financial assessments.  With some
misdemeanors, as with securities fraud, antitrust claims, and
white-collar crime more generally, the legislature or the prose-
cutor offers the wrongdoer a choice between paying a fine and
imprisonment.24  Violent crimes, or perhaps simply those asso-
21 See Exodus 21–22 (Revised English Bible); see also Saul Levmore, Rethink-
ing Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61
TUL. L. REV. 235, 266–73 (1986) (discussing negligence and strict-liability rules in
Exodus).
22 Exodus 21:28–30 (Revised English Bible):
When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox must be put to
death by stoning, and its flesh is not to be eaten; the owner of the ox
will be free from liability.  If, however, the ox has for some time past
been a vicious animal, and the owner has been duly warned but has
not kept it under control, and the ox kills a man or a woman, then
the ox must be stoned to death, and the owner put to death as well.
If, however, the penalty is commuted for a money payment, he must
pay in redemption of his life whatever is imposed upon him.
23 See Levmore, supra note 21, at 263. R
24 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (providing fines or imprisonment for certain
anti-trust violations); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012) (providing fines or imprisonment for
certain types of securities fraud); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.040 (West 2017) (pro-
viding that “a fine may be levied in lieu of imprisonment” for misdemeanors).
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ciated with many low-income perpetrators, do not come with
that choice.25  Given this decision, a private party like the
storekeeper should not be able to choose for the robber that
which the state has ruled out.
But there are other perspectives.  Perhaps the state would
offer a choice, or would much prefer to attach financial penal-
ties to many crimes, if only to save on incarceration costs, but
is stymied by the fact that so many convicted wrongdoers do
not have the means to pay.  The law finds it unseemly, or politi-
cally impossible, to incarcerate the poor while allowing more
affluent wrongdoers to buy their way out of prison.  It is barely
possible that the law would allow the storekeeper and robber to
bargain privately if it thought that the latter could be as effec-
tively deterred by monetary payments as by incarceration—so
long as the ability of some wrongdoers to pay their way out of
prison is hidden from view.  In any event, it is plain that the
typical robber’s financial circumstances mean that the store-
keeper will be unable to extract a high settlement.  The store-
keeper might selfishly prefer a modest payment over the
wrongdoer’s incarceration, but the state’s deterrence interest
requires that the storekeeper and robber not be allowed to
bargain out of sight of the law and certainly not for some trivial
amount that will fail to deter wrongdoers.
Intuitions might change in the case where the storekeeper
bargains not with a robber but with an employee, EM, who is
caught embezzling.  Again, imagine that wrongdoer and victim,
EM and S, bargain to avoid calling in the police and to allow EM
to continue as an employee after making amends.  There are
several reasons why confidentiality-for-pay should be more ac-
ceptable in this situation than where AR and S bargain.  First,
the employed embezzler has the means to make substantial
payments, and money might serve as an efficient deterrent.
Second, by continuing to employ the wrongdoer, the store-
25 Serious white-collar crimes are often resolved by the state’s extraction of
very large penalties from wrongdoers accused of securities fraud and other such
matters. See, e.g., Peter MacKenna, Financial Institutions Fraud, 54 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1333, 1357–59 (2017) (detailing several billion dollar settlements in securi-
ties fraud cases).  We might set these aside because the state does the extracting
and there is certainly no extra payment for confidentiality.  Indeed, the large fine,
or settlement, is advertised as a deterrent to wrongdoing.  But there is room to
argue that these are simply cases where the law recognizes that financial pay-
ments can deter just as well as incarceration, and with much lower social cost.
Law does not offer conventional robbers a choice between making large payments
and incarceration because it is politically and morally difficult to allow the wealthy
to “buy their way” out of prison.  In the case of securities fraud, there are few poor
people to ruin the visual landscape.
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keeper internalizes a good part of the cost and danger associ-
ated with a serial wrongdoer whose pattern would be revealed
and perhaps halted but for the confidentiality agreement.  In
principle, a potential embezzler is deterred because he knows
that apprehension leads either to imprisonment or, through
bargaining, to a significant financial loss.  The employer ex-
tracts payment but also keeps the wrongdoer close at hand; he
or she absorbs the cost of monitoring this employee; and he or
she will be the most likely to suffer from further wrongdoing.  If
this second feature is missing, and the employer extracts pay-
ment but discharges the employee, law must count on the de-
terrence provided by the payment extracted from the
wrongdoer.  It would be unsurprising if it were in just such
cases that law regarded the employer as illegally extorting from
the employee, though this is hard to imagine in cases where the
embezzler initiated the bargain.26
A third option is for S and EM to bargain—but to be re-
quired to report their bargain to the state.  If the problem with a
confidential agreement is that the storekeeper gives insufficient
consideration to third-party interests, then perhaps the state
should be offered the opportunity to veto the private bargain.  It
might normally approve the private bargain—as it does the
settlement of contract and tort claims—both because it saves
the costs of further investigation and incarceration, and also
because it has no good means of forcing employers to report
crimes in the first place.  Law might recognize that the em-
ployer’s extraction serves to deter embezzlers.  In theory, the
state could condition its approval on the continued employ-
ment of the wrongdoer for a period of years.  This sort of servi-
tude can create a risk of exploitation by the employer, but at
least here the employee can quit and risk criminal charges.
Disclosure of private bargains with criminals is hard
enough to encourage and even require; an opportunity for the
state to approve or veto such private bargains is completely
impractical.  To make an evaluation, the state needs to know
the identity of the wrongdoer, and this identification is an im-
portant part of what the accused will pay to avoid.27  One possi-
bility is for the state to permit private bargains involving first-
26 For one thing, the employer might claim that he or she was afraid to turn
down the embezzler’s offer.  Moreover, claim-of-right cases always involve initia-
tion and action by the victim; here the alleged extortionist would be the
respondent.
27 The state could promise to record for the purpose of identifying repeat
offenders, but not to use the information for other purposes.  The accused would
pay to avoid this list as well.
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time offenders and to require disclosure simply to separate
repeat and one-off offenders.  A first-time wrongdoer might
then pay more for nondisclosure to avoid classification as a
repeat offender, so that the system must rely on the employer’s
security concerns in order to motivate the employer to report
the transaction.  Few employers want to hire serial embezzlers.
The employer may not be ready to accept payment in return for
nondisclosure because the employer wants to know if this is
truly a first-time offender or because the wrongdoer may later
on have reason to reveal that the employer did not disclose
when law required disclosure.28
Generally speaking, it is in victims’ self-interest to report
criminal wrongdoing to the police when there is reason to fear
further harm from the wrongdoer, where there is a decent pros-
pect that the police will catch the wrongdoer and law will force
the return of lost property or other restitution, or where the
victim hopes to collect from an insurer.  Where there is an
ongoing relationship, crimes are often unreported; an employer
who suspects or discovers low-level embezzlement or theft will
often dismiss but not report the employee.29  A call to the police
brings on costs, and especially so where the accused doubles
down and makes a counterclaim—which law might resolve in-
correctly.  In these cases, the law ought to welcome private
bargains between victim and wrongdoer, as this option pro-
vides more reliable deterrence.  In any event, it seems clear that
what motivates the bargain between a storekeeper and an
armed robber or embezzler is objectionable; the parties seek to
substitute private profit for criminal prosecution and
incarceration.
We do not suggest that criminal law should be reconfigured
to allow or even encourage private agreements between armed
robbers and storekeepers.  Unlike the case of A and M’s tort
settlement, victims of armed robberies are unlikely to extract
sufficiently large settlements from financially distressed
criminals.  The very reason that the modern state resorts to
incarceration is likely to stand in the way of obtaining sufficient
28 The situation resembles legal attempts to combat bribery by making it a
crime on just one side of the transaction.  If, for example, it is a crime to receive a
bribe, then the bribed party must worry that the bribing party will later on report
the bribe, or threaten to do so. See infra note 53. R
29 See Paul Bonny et al., Revisiting Employee Fraud: Gender, Investigation
Outcomes and Offender Motivation, 22 J. FIN. CRIME 447, 452 (2015) (“For a variety
of reasons, organisations are not readily disposed towards reporting employee
fraud, instead resolving instances of offending by terminating the employment
relationship.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 18 24-JAN-18 10:54
328 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:311
deterrence through private extractions.  On the other hand, the
state has difficulty encouraging or even compelling some vic-
tims to come forward.30  If it pays them directly, their credibility
is often reduced—though no one seems to object to restitution.
There will, therefore, be cases where private agreements pro-
vide more deterrence than the criminal law, and it is for this
reason that the law ought to tolerate some experimentation
with private agreements in lieu of criminal charges.  The em-
ployer-embezzler case is a potential example because the vic-
tim is in a position to internalize third-party harms.
Meanwhile, the claim-of-right doctrine needs rethinking.31  The
more serious concern is that the victim will collect too little to
deter the wrongdoer.32
III
FALSE CLAIMS AND MORAL HAZARDS: CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL CASES
When a victim profits from the identification of a criminal,
there is the problem of moral hazard.  If an employer can ex-
tract payments from an embezzling employee, as suggested in
Part II, then an employer might wrongfully accuse an employee
of embezzlement or tempt the employee by entrusting him with
bundles of cash.  An unprincipled employer might have an eye
on profiting from a misstep by the employee followed by accu-
sation and negotiation in the shadow of the criminal law.  Sim-
ple restitution, which is what law normally provides alongside
criminal punishment, avoids this moral hazard because it does
not leave the accuser better off than before the alleged crime.  It
offers a reward for coming forward, because the victim might be
30 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BJS BULL NO. NCJ
238536, SPECIAL REPORT: VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006–2010,
at 2 (2012) (reporting percentages of victimizations that were not reported to
police and reasons victims gave for not reporting violent crime victimizations).
31 The doctrine is at its best when it discourages a second round of violence
between the original criminal and victim.  If the law allows the victim to over-
collect, the victim may be tempted to pursue the criminal or look for the criminal’s
property.  In turn, the criminal will prepare for this attack.  The conventional
limitation on “hot pursuit” addresses this problem, though it is aimed at the
question of physical harm inflicted after a property crime.  The doctrine is proba-
bly misguided if applied to peaceful bargains between the parties.
32 In principle, private and public remedies can be combined.  The employer
and embezzler, for example, might gain the state’s consent to their negotiated
payments so long as the wrongdoer serves a short time in prison.  We do not
pursue such combinations in part because of the intuition that one major benefit
of settlement is the cost savings derived from avoiding trial and involving the
criminal law system.
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made whole with the help of the law, but it does not enable the
victim to earn a tidy profit.
We do not mean to put excessive weight on this moral
hazard risk.  Employers who falsely accuse their employees
risk counterclaims and a loss of employee morale.  There are,
after all, other situations where employers might gain from
falsely accusing and then discharging an employee.  For exam-
ple, an employee might be on the verge of earning an accumu-
lated bonus or vacation time; an employee might be paid more
than his marginal product, but protected from discharge by age
discrimination law.  In these situations, there is a moral haz-
ard, but it does not seem sufficient to tempt widespread misbe-
havior by employers.  Nevertheless, in cataloguing the
advantages and disadvantages of confidentiality agreements or
of agreements to avoid the criminal law, if deterrence (with
attendant savings of trial and incarceration costs) is on the
positive side of the ledger, it is appropriate to note that false
claims ought to be placed on the negative side.33
Returning to civil cases, moral hazard is again a concern—
but not a showstopper—wherever the victim can collect more
than compensatory damages.  When the tort victim, A, bar-
gains with M, A does not know in advance that M will pay
handsomely for silence; M may opt for trial or already face
other plaintiffs with similar claims.  Second, M has reason to
investigate the circumstances of A’s injury and to turn suspi-
cions about self-injury into a claim that A was comparatively
negligent.  Third, where personal injury is involved—and this
seems to be the focus of sunshine-in-litigation statutes—law
often contemplates punitive damages and thus seems to dis-
count the moral hazard problem in favor of deterrence or
strongly expressive remedies; confidential settlements thus
have good, or at least familiar, company.  A deterrence perspec-
tive offers a fourth reason to be untroubled by moral hazard.
Even if A manufactures a claim against M, when M pays for
confidentiality it is often because M thinks that A’s claim will
resonate with juries and encourage other claims.  Allowing a
payment that produces profit for A is, in the end, likely to deter
M in the first place, and that is a major accomplishment.  Fi-
nally, M can always go to trial, so that there is an upper limit on
A’s power to extract.
33 The false claims problem does not alone explain much.  A storekeeper may
have incontrovertible evidence of AR’s crime, but law will still reject private settle-
ment for reasons discussed earlier. See supra Part II.
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Nevertheless, if victims or even witnesses are to be re-
warded for coming forward to report wrongdoing, it is probably
better for the payment to come openly from the legal authority
than for it to come secretly from the accused, who hopes that a
confidential agreement will keep the police and criminal law
system at bay.  Private payments offer deterrence, as we have
stressed, but without the safeguards of criminal procedure and
the ability to counterclaim for defamation and other causes of
action, they risk generating false claims.  This preference for
public over private resolution is clearest where the costs of
public law are low.  Thus, if tort suits could be greatly stream-
lined, law would (and should) be less likely to favor settlements
of the kind we depicted between A and M.  The more efficient a
legal system, the less is the social gain from avoiding it by way
of confidential settlement agreements.
If the legal system can be counted on to be reliable and
relatively free of interest-group corruption, then confidential
settlements might be accepted only where they preempt legal
actions that are likely to end in money payments between the
settling parties.  A settlement between A and M, the injured
victim and presumed tortfeasor, is in the shadow of a trial with
the same adversaries.  A may be hoping for payments that sub-
stitute for those that would be made to other injured parties,
but it is not obvious that law should object so long as the
defendant is properly deterred.  In contrast, the storekeeper
who seeks payment from a robber or embezzler is at least in
part capitalizing on the fact that incarceration is very costly to
the wrongdoer and of no direct benefit to the victim, whose
testimony is essential for conviction.  If the law wanted to offer
financial motivation to victims and other witnesses, it could
simply offer payments, as it occasionally does with
whistleblowers.  When it does not, it is because it fears that
private enrichment will decrease credibility or even bring about
false claims, and that these costs exceed any additional deter-
rence that could be availed.  Note that the law’s disinclination
to sort robbers according to their ability to pay in order to avoid
incarceration is not much of an explanation; paying for testi-
mony is surely less expensive than paying for incarceration.  In
sum, it is easy to understand an aversion to confidential agree-
ments between armed robbers and their victims against a
background in which the state generally declines to award fi-
nancial inducements to victims.
False claims and moral hazards can also be assessed by
way of the time-honored distinction between negligence and
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intentional wrongdoing.  Law seems most comfortable allowing
a victim to collect multiple damages when the defendant is an
intentional wrongdoer and the evidence of his or her wrongdo-
ing is out of plaintiff’s control.34  If so, then there is a kind of
precedent for high-priced confidentiality agreements.  If M* is
an intentional wrongdoer who places a high value on staying
out of court, the injured party, A, can extract a high settle-
ment.35  The concern is not that A will profit but rather that A
will extract too little.  A high settlement, like punitive damages,
deters wrongdoers like M* in contexts where moral hazard is
unlikely because the wrongdoer who acts intentionally rarely
injures a victim who contributes to the problem.  Put differ-
ently, there is an intuition that intentional wrongdoing is worse
than negligence, so that the legal system should be called in
and not bypassed by confidential agreements.  But an alterna-
tive view is that intentional wrongdoing is less likely to generate
or interact with moral hazard problems, so that high, confiden-
tial settlements—in the manner of punitive damages—are rela-
tively tolerable, if not attractive.
The distinction, if any, between negligent and intentional
wrongdoing can be tested by returning once again to our store-
keeper, S, and considering her transactions with customers
whose checks are rejected for insufficient funds.  Retail stores
often give notice that they will charge twenty-five dollars or
even fifty dollars for a returned check.  Some states have laws
barring charges above a specified amount.36  The normal fee is
greater than the average fee that a bank would charge to the
depositor, but it is probably not more than that fee plus the
value of the time spent by the store employee tasked with con-
tacting the customer and obtaining payment.  If S has reason
to think that the bad-check writing was intentional, and thus
criminal fraud, then S is also likely to find that the customer
will not quickly make good on the check and fee.  In that case, S
has reason to contact the police.  Cases in which companies
34 Cf. Doug Rendleman, Commercial Bribery: Choice and Measurement Within
a Remedies Smorgasbord, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369, 445–49 (2017) (suggesting
that in some cases, multiple damages serve to deter intentional wrongdoers).
35 A law and economics approach favors punitive, or multiple, damages when
defendants think they can often escape detection or lawsuit.  Law does not seem
to reflect this insight, so the case for high and confidential settlements is not as
close as it could be to punitive damages.
36 In Missouri, for example, an institution may add a service charge of no
more than twenty-five dollars. See MO. REV. STAT. § 570.120.1 (2016).  Some
states, such as California, also allow legal action for bad checks, though certain
conditions must be met and the maximum recovery is $1500. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1719 (West 1998).
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profit handsomely by collecting fees from bad-check writers
seem to involve collection companies rather than storekeepers,
so there is no indication of a false claim or moral hazard
problem.
IV
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES AND UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY
PROCESSES
Sexual assault cases outside of university disciplinary sys-
tems can find their way into civil and criminal courts.  In these
forums, as in university disciplinary settings, many victims are
eager to preserve their privacy and are therefore at a bargaining
disadvantage.  The level of deterrence that might be expected in
most tort cases is unlikely to be met here because defendants
who would otherwise pay for confidentiality know that their
adversaries also value privacy.  The balance of power is indeter-
minate, though frequent withdrawals of claims, or even private
settlements, are to be expected.  Sexual assault victims are
encouraged to come forward in the criminal system by a (lim-
ited) promise that they can remain (publicly) unidentified,
though in a tightly-knit community this is often impossible.
States might enable privacy either by statute or by way of
judges deciding to keep some part of a record sealed.37  Ideally,
the promise of privacy—often supported by journalistic con-
ventions38—encourages meritorious claims.  It is apparent that
both sides might be willing to pay for privacy, but law is in-
clined to enable only one side’s anonymity.
Sexual assault cases processed on university campuses
are like fraud and employment discrimination matters in civil
courts, not only because of the recently imposed preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard,39 but also because the pattern
problem is paramount, and because there is an information
37 For example, the Crime Victims Protection Act amended Florida law to
make all court records that could reveal the victim’s identity exempt from public
disclosure.  Crime Victims Protection Act of 1994, FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(h)
(2016) (amended 2000).  However, states cannot always suppress disclosure of
victims’ identities. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding
that the First Amendment protects a newspaper against a claim for damages
under state law where the newspaper truthfully but accidentally revealed the
victim’s identity).
38 See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 528 (noting The Florida Star’s internal
policy against publishing the names of sexual offense victims).
39 See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
881, 901 (2016) (stating that universities “must investigate and adjudicate stu-
dent sexual assault cases to fulfill their Title IX obligations,” and the process must
use a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).
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asymmetry between the parties who might bargain to preempt
decisions by the authorities.  The asymmetry is not relevant in
all cases, because a serious claim need not be a part of a
pattern, but in many cases, the accused knows better than the
accuser whether there is a pattern of wrongful behavior that
can come to light if multiple accusers come forward.  A given
victim cannot easily discern the value of confidentiality to the
accused.  In contrast, the tort plaintiff, A, may not know how
many others have linked M to their injuries, but A has some
idea of M’s sales volume and an expert can help A assess M’s
exposure in preparation for reaching a confidentiality agree-
ment.  Even an employer often has a good sense of the incarcer-
ation risk his employee-embezzler faces,40 though perhaps not
of the latter’s subjective valuation of liberty.  None of this is
true for the victim of sexual assault—and any advertising or
public search for other victims will expose the offender in a way
that makes it harder for the victim to extract payment for confi-
dentiality.  The victim can offer confidentiality only by foregoing
a search for a pattern of misbehavior.  We do not mean to imply
that the victim is eager or even willing to extract payment from
the perpetrator; indeed, campus cases involve victims who
seem to place high value on emotional and institutional sup-
port as well as the removal of an offender from campus.  The
storekeeper and tort victim encountered in the earlier Parts of
this Article are likely to place much lower value on institutional
support and removal; their defendants are likely to have an
easier time bargaining for confidentiality.  Nevertheless, it is
instructive (and of practical interest) to consider confidentiality
agreements between victims and those they accuse of sexual
assault—as well as other matters adjudicated on campuses.
Imagine that Y engages in sexual activity with X when X is
unable to provide true consent.  Subsequently, X initiates a
complaint against Y within a university’s disciplinary system.
After the Title IX investigator questions the parties, Y (in an
unusual move, to be sure) offers X a monetary settlement that
includes a confidentiality agreement,41 and X then withdraws
her complaint.  The argument for respecting the confidentiality
40 Having rejected confidential agreements in typical criminal cases, like AR-
S, we do not consider repeat offender (“three strikes”) statutes, which can obvi-
ously influence these bargains.  A strong argument against confidentiality there,
is that the police have much better information than does the storekeeper about
the criminal’s past and future career plans.  The employer in the text’s example is
unlikely to continue employing a repeat offender.
41 If the university has imposed a no-contact order, as is common, the parties
can bargain through their attorneys.
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agreement and withdrawal is that future victims may be less
inclined to file complaints if they discover that, once initiated,
they cannot be halted.  But given that the penalty Y faces
within the disciplinary system does not inure to X’s direct ben-
efit, and is likely intended to provide a measure of campus
safety (in addition to deterrence and retribution), it seems im-
prudent for the university to enable Y to pay X in order to end
the matter.  Even if financial consequences can deter Y from
sexual misbehavior, deterrence requires that X extract a sub-
stantial settlement from Y.  This seems unlikely because Y
knows that X is not eager to recount her experience to stran-
gers and subject herself to questioning.  Put differently, even if
we do not analogize the case to that involving the storekeeper
and armed robber, because we think that the victim of sexual
assault identifies more with other similarly situated victims
than does the typical victim of a robbery, there is reason to fear
that X will not extract enough, in return for a promise of confi-
dentiality, to deter Y.  X might well reason that Y faces suspen-
sion from the university and will pay a good deal for X to
withdraw her claim, but at the same time Y knows that X wants
to avoid the emotional costs attached to a hearing.  X also may
not know whether her complaint against Y enables other vic-
tims to succeed with similar accusations.42  In short, because
the accuser in these cases is likely to value privacy far more
than plaintiffs in most civil and criminal suits, accusers may
settle too quickly and cheaply to serve the deterrence goal.
A very different argument against confidential settlement is
that there is a danger of false claims.  As in the claim against
the alleged embezzler, and unlike that against the armed rob-
ber, there is rarely incontrovertible evidence against the wrong-
doer.  The prospect of profit as well as protection of (the
complainant’s) privacy raises the danger of a false claim.
Note also that the conventional reason for allowing and
enabling confidential settlements—that they save on trial and
error costs—is very weak here.  These hearings are short af-
fairs, so they are not associated with high costs, at least not of
the conventional kind.  To be sure, the parties may anticipate
significant emotional costs, but that is true for accused
criminals and prosecution witnesses in many criminal cases,
and it is rarely taken to be a separate argument in favor of plea
bargains.
42 See supra subpart I.B for our earlier discussion of sexual assault cases
against celebrity defendants.
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An important countervailing argument, as expressed at the
outset of this discussion, is that victims may hesitate to bring
claims (even more than they do at present) if they learn that
they cannot withdraw from the adjudicatory process.  The
question for Title IX officers and university counsel is whether
this single argument outweighs the others, or whether Title IX
should be read to grant the complainant the right to withdraw a
claim.43  We suspect it does not and, indeed, that if a university
were certain that the accused, Y, had paid cash to the accuser,
X, it would proceed with a disciplinary hearing and try to man-
age with the evidence at hand.  It might even choose to disci-
pline any student who failed to appear at a hearing.
It can be useful to compare these claims to other matters
that come before similar disciplinary boards.  Familiar cases
pit a student against the university because of alleged misbe-
havior such as vandalism or plagiarism.  The university is a
party as well as a provider of law.  Financial settlements are
inappropriate not because of under-deterrence, but either be-
cause of the danger that wealthy students will buy their way
out of disciplinary charges or because the university’s imparti-
ality will be questioned if it stands to gain money in a system
with no appeals.  In cases involving academic dishonesty, a
student or faculty member might accuse a student of violating
a university rule; neither state nor federal courts are inclined or
well-suited to these claims.44
Imagine that a faculty member accuses a student of plagia-
rism, and the university begins to investigate and schedules a
disciplinary hearing.  Now the faculty member withdraws the
43 Title IX is silent with respect to a right to withdraw a complaint, though
universities sometimes provide for withdrawal. See Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012); see, e.g., Eastern Va. Med.
Sch., Title IX/Sex Discrimination Reporting and Complaint Process, at Section
III.G., http://www.evms.edu/about_evms/leadership/general_counsel/legal_
and_compliance/legalcompliance_policies__information/title_ix/complaint_pro-
cess/ [https://perma.cc/C29D-XQ66] (“The Reporting Party may withdraw a Re-
port or Grievance at any time.  EVMS may, however, still have a duty to
investigate matters (to the extent possible without the Reporting Party’s coopera-
tion) and take appropriate action.”).
44 When a disappointed party challenges the university’s procedures and
determinations, courts are generally deferential to the university’s rules and
norms. See, e.g., Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt.
1994) (concluding that a disciplinary action or procedure is “fundamentally un-
fair, arbitrary or capricious” if it deviates from established university rules); Holert
v. Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a disci-
plined student is “entitled only to those procedural safeguards that the
[u]niversity agreed to provide”); Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573
A.2d 575, 578 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that there was no basis for interfer-
ing with the right of a private school to impose its own punishments for cheating).
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allegation and says that she and the student have settled the
matter.  Would the university dismiss the case?  If the faculty
member insists that after some recent discussion with the stu-
dent she realized that her assignments had been unclear re-
garding the use of various sources, and the student simply
misunderstood the rules, then there would be little point in
pursuing the charge previously brought against the student.
But what if the faculty member says nothing of the sort and
there is suspicion that the student paid the faculty member,
perhaps because a wealthy parent had traveled to campus and
met with the instructor?  Alternatively, what if the student,
once charged, files a claim of harassment against the faculty
member, and then the two bargain and agree to the mutual
withdrawal of all claims?  The startling possibility of payment
offers some deterrence, and it seems objectionable to allow the
parties to convert into cash or avoid a remedy determined by
the authority.  It would be objectionable if the instructor an-
nounced that she and the student had agreed that the charge
would be withdrawn on condition that the student’s family do-
nates a specified amount to a given charitable cause, and it is
certainly objectionable if the payment profits the instructor.
Indeed, the university’s suspension and expulsion remedies
ought to be less convertible to cash than the penalties faced by
a robber or embezzler because it is implausible that the most
efficient and politically acceptable penalties are fines.  In con-
trast to the university, which prefers suspension and similar
remedies, it is likely that with respect to many crimes the state
regards its principle remedy, incarceration, as a second-best
remedy.  Note that the faculty member, like the storekeeper,
gains nothing when the student is disciplined in the conven-
tional, nonmonetary fashion.  If faculty and students can bring
claims of academic dishonesty against one another and then
settle privately, there is a distinct problem of false claims be-
cause the claimant suffers no injury and yet stands to profit
from the accused’s fear of conviction, trial costs, or loss of
reputation.  It seems unwise to respect a confidential agree-
ment in this context; it converts a university’s chosen remedy,
such as suspension or expulsion, into a private monetary
payment.45
45 The situation is not quite like the storekeeper-robber negotiation.  In that
case, even with incontrovertible evidence, we do not want to allow private parties
to convert the state’s chosen remedy into cash.  But here, the university might be
willing to offer a choice between payment and suspension for some violations, but
it is inhibited by its inability to separate credibly its judicial and other functions.
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To be sure, in this case, as in the sexual assault context,
we are unlikely to know whether the accused actually bought
his way out of a nonmonetary remedy.  But the prospect of
confidentiality, or private settlement itself, surely encourages
payments in both settings.46  If settlement is acceptable for
sexual assault claims but not for plagiarism, it is again because
of the great preference given to rules that encourage victims to
report and bring claims of sexual assault in the first place.  A
further distinction is that few sexual assault cases can proceed
intelligibly without the participation of the complainant and
respondent, while many cases of academic dishonesty could go
forward on the basis of the written evidence available to the
adjudicator.
An interesting feature of these university cases is that
while the parties may bargain for confidentiality, and even
agree not to discuss the case and not to denigrate one another,
the university has acquired enough information to watch for
patterns of misbehavior.  In the tort case between A and M,
unless the parties go to trial, it is difficult to know whether
there is any merit to A’s claim.  The same is true for a sexual
assault case against a celebrity, as discussed in subpart I.B.
But here the university’s own investigator has interviewed the
parties and has often questioned witnesses and friends of the
protagonists.  The university cannot know whether a discipli-
nary committee would have found the respondent responsible
under the prevailing preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,
but it has much more information than does the legal authority
in most tort, assault, or embezzlement cases.  We might regard
the private agreement as semi-confidential because the univer-
sity knows everything but the terms of the settlement.  Simi-
larly, even if the university chooses to cease prosecution of the
academic dishonesty case sketched above, the university has
information about the behavior of the student who was ac-
cused.  It would be unfair to say that the accused is essentially
convicted without a hearing—because no university discipline
is meted out—but if another claim is brought against the same
If there were incontrovertible evidence of wrongdoing, private payments might be
acceptable.
46 See generally Gregg Stevens & Lorin Subar, Confidentiality in Settlement
Agreements Is a Virtual Necessity, 29 GP SOLO 24 (2012), https://www.american
bar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandcon
fidentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_virtual_necessity.html
[https://perma.cc/PDJ9-9GLS] (discussing reasons why plaintiffs and defend-
ants find confidentiality to be worth the cost and virtually a requirement of
settlement).
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accused, the university is sure to take into account the earlier
case, though it was dismissed.  This semi-confidentiality, ex-
panded upon in the next Part, should not distract us from the
concern about insufficient deterrence.  That concern is height-
ened in the campus sexual assault case by the observation that
victims bear costs in adjudication and might therefore not ex-
tract as much from—or deter—their wrongdoers as do settling
victims of other wrongs.
In these campus cases, the accused might well be willing to
pay more for the promise of full confidentiality, but that re-
quires bargaining with the accuser before any complaint is
reported to the Title IX investigator.  Moreover, as a practical
matter, victims are unlikely to want to communicate with those
they accuse; one consequence of beginning the disciplinary
process is the (oft desired) benefit of a no-contact order be-
tween the parties.47  In turn, the accused is often caught by
surprise.  Many sexual interactions take place close to the con-
sent/no-consent line,48 and it is unlikely that many people are
sufficiently confident that they will be accused as to cause
them to initiate bargains for payment in return for confidential-
ity.  Where the sexual interaction ends badly and a party does
have reason to think that an accusation is forthcoming, the
best defense is likely to be a quick departure, silence, or apol-
ogy.  An offer of settlement is insensitive and unwise—unless it
is simply an offer to stay far away from the other party, a
homemade no-contact agreement.
Settlement is more likely in cases where each party has
brought a claim against the other.  X accuses Y of nonconsen-
sual sex, but Y accuses X of the same, claiming both parties
were inebriated, or Y accuses X of harassing him by filing a
false claim in the wake of a collapsed relationship.  Each party
may firmly believe the truth of his or her allegations, and each
avoids the emotional costs and risk of unfavorable judgment by
settling the case and withdrawing the complaint.  Their settle-
ment may have a monetary component, especially where law-
yers’ fees are involved, but the important motivation is (apt to
be the desire) to steer clear of university discipline, and per-
haps also to avoid the emotional toll of a hearing.  If the univer-
sity allows the withdrawal, it is because it is impractical to
proceed without the parties, because to disallow withdrawal
risks chilling future claims, and because the university has
47 The order is a private one with no state involvement.  A party who violates
the order risks further discipline by the university.
48 See Gersen & Suk, supra note 39, at 889–90. R
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already obtained enough information about the interaction to
assess a pattern of wrongdoing or a threat to “campus safety,”
both now and in the event of another accusation against one of
the parties.
V
BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY
A. Translucency in Civil Cases
In the torts context, there are some cases where it is the
victim who prefers privacy—apart from the possibility of using
privacy as a means of extracting a greater settlement—and
others where it is the defendant who prefers anonymity or other
forms of confidentiality.  There are several reasons why the
defendant may value confidentiality, especially with regard to
substantial settlements.  It might raise litigation costs for
(other) plaintiffs; it hides the signal about the substantive claim
from other parties who have not connected their injuries to
defendant’s behavior; it keeps defendant’s assessment of its
exposure in court hidden from other plaintiffs who might nego-
tiate or litigate differently if they were well informed; and it
protects the firm’s reputation.
There are certainly cases where defendants are happy to
advertise large settlements.  Thus, a defendant enmeshed in
litigation over an oil spill is dealing with a substantive matter
that is already known to the public.  A large payment might
enhance rather than detract from its corporate image, and it
might satisfy regulators and legislators who would otherwise
prepare to impose further burdens on the identified polluter.
In contrast, a law firm that settles a discrimination claim initi-
ated by a female partner might prefer confidentiality for all the
reasons noted above.  Publicity might hurt the firm when it
recruits new employees; it might dissuade some clients from
engaging the firm; it might suggest to other women at the firm
that the firm has indeed discriminated against women, and
they ought to file or threaten to bring claims; and it might
cause women who think they were the victims of discrimination
by the firm to make or increase demands because they now
perceive the firm’s vulnerability or inclination to settle.  The
discussion in Part I emphasized that the firm’s gains from con-
fidentiality might translate into a higher payment to the first
complainant in this case; in turn, if she agrees to confidential-
ity, the firm is further deterred by the prospect of such a larger
payment.  Ideally, if she can extract something close to the full
value of confidentiality, there will be a social gain because of
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 30 24-JAN-18 10:54
340 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:311
the savings in trial and negotiation costs with other plaintiffs.
The first successful complainant is rewarded for discovering a
key fact or cause, and for giving the firm reason and opportu-
nity to change its ways and protect against future losses.
The preceding description may be too optimistic, but it is
unlikely to be entirely misguided.  It suggests the possibility of
a middle ground; the defendant firm might pay for some confi-
dentiality (and thus be deterred to a degree), but it might be
prevented from keeping everything hidden from other possible
victims.  We have applied the term semi-confidential to agree-
ments in which the precise settlement terms of sexual assault
cases are secreted by the parties, but where the convening
authority is aware of the original claims and testimony of the
parties.  Indeed, the authority in those campus cases has
about all of the information it needs to discern a troubling
pattern of behavior.  In most civil cases, however, the legal
authority has not undertaken any investigation, and so it has
no information.  A compromise, or semi-confidential, approach
must aim to liberate some information that is useful to third
parties or the state while still encouraging the defendant to
settle—at a price that packs some deterrence punch.
The most obvious compromise is to allow the amount of
settlement to be confidential, but not its subject matter.  There
are certainly other compromises between transparency and
confidentiality; the parties’ locations or identities might be
withheld, as they are in some countries,49 or confidentiality
could be limited to the subject matter—rather than the amount
of settlement.  But the intuition behind the suggestion that law
support semi-confidentiality, or translucency, with respect to
the amount of settlement, is that doing so might minimize error
costs while retaining the deterrence value of disclosure.  The
defendant firm pays to keep evidence of its vulnerability secret;
its reputation and other interests might also be preserved if
third parties are in the dark about the settlement amount.
After all, many firms make modest payments to avoid litigation,
and news of a very large settlement is usually required to at-
49 In France, for example, litigant identity is protected in divorce proceedings;
criminal prosecution involving sexually transmitted diseases or nursing of chil-
dren; some defamation claims; and cases involving minors, victims of sexual
assault, or persons who have been the subject of plenary adoption. See Salome´
Cordier & Marie Castagne´, L’Anonymisation des De´cisions de Justice, LE PETIT
JURIST, Section II.A.1, https://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/wp-content/uploads/2011/
05/L%E2%80%99anonymisation%20des%20d%C3%A9cisions%20de%20jus
tice.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8A-G9SM].
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tract attention and trigger presumptions of bad behavior.50
Confidentiality regarding settlement amount is normally of
greater value to the defendant, and thus to the settling plaintiff,
because news of a settlement amount sets a floor for later
settlements with other plaintiffs.  Disclosure’s effects, however,
operate along several dimensions, and the suggestion that se-
crecy as to the monetary component of confidentiality agree-
ments may correctly balance deterrence and error is not easy to
justify.  But it is certainly possible that allowing complete confi-
dentiality, both for settled cases and for payments in return for
releases before claims are filed, has negative effects on unin-
formed third parties and under-deters wrongdoers because vic-
tims do not recognize how much they can extract.  This
Article’s suggestion is that in these cases, law should en-
courage translucency; defendants (even in the pre-filing stage)
should be encouraged to disclose information but not asked to
disclose the amount of payment to a settling party.  This trans-
lucency proposal presupposes that a plaintiff cannot ade-
quately assess the total liability the defendant faces in the
event that other plaintiffs are fully informed; the plaintiff,
therefore, will not extract the full value of secrecy to the defen-
dant, and may not extract enough to properly deter this and
other defendants.  Translucency rewards plaintiffs in propor-
tion to their injuries and encourages all of them to come for-
ward with their individual claims.  On the other hand, by
keeping the amount of settlement secret, plaintiffs base their
claims more on information related to their injuries and less on
information related to the settling behavior of the defendant.
Note, too, that inasmuch as strike suit plaintiffs are en-
couraged by blockbuster settlements, translucency may reduce
their incentives to file.51
50 If disclosure of settlement amounts raises costs (errors) more than benefits
(deterrence or correctly aimed compensation), then greater secrecy is desirable.
This conclusion assumes a kind of monotonicity or single-peaked preference such
that it is not yet better to have total transparency.
51 While various translucency proposals can require disclosure, or allow se-
crecy with respect to any number of settlement features, our distinguishing sub-
ject matter from the amount of settlement focuses directly on gaining deterrence
while minimizing error.  In most cases, other features of litigation and settle-
ment—including jurisdiction, presiding judge, parties’ attorneys, and length of
negotiations—impact deterrence and error weakly and unevenly.  Essential
claims and bargaining outcomes are far more important.  Similarly, our proposal
for translucency in sexual assault cases, discussed supra Part IV and infra Part V,
is based upon the observation that privacy is of special importance to the parties
in these cases, and is likely to affect the incentive to bring a claim.  There may be
other specialized settings where effective translucency proposals might revolve
around particular settlement features in order to optimize deterrence and error.
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Any disclosure requirement, whether partial or complete,
runs the risk of driving bargains earlier in time or further un-
derground.  But there are ways to encourage translucency.
One of these is to make it a requirement of professional respon-
sibility; the same rules that allow attorneys to withhold some
information from their present clients because of prior confi-
dentiality agreements to which the attorneys were privy could
require attorneys to disclose information to the authorities or
to third parties of whom they are aware.  A second strategy is to
refuse to enforce agreements that violate the disclosure re-
quirement.  The defendant who seeks confidentiality might be
expected to withhold payments until the end of the quiet pe-
riod, and now the plaintiff will fear that payment will not be
made as promised.  This is a weak strategy because the parties
can resort to third-party intermediaries.  A third strategy is to
attach a penalty to any failure to abide by sunshine laws and,
in this case, to partial sunshine requirements, for it stands to
reason that our suggestion is that sunshine laws be trimmed to
require disclosure of the substance but not the terms of settle-
ments where there is reason to think that serious third-party
injury is at stake.52  The penalty for nondisclosure might carry
with it a free pass for any party that reveals the other’s viola-
tion.53  A fourth strategy is simply to make it clear that courts
will not enforce full confidentiality agreements; if M values con-
fidentiality, M is counting on the settling plaintiff, A, not to
disclose out of fear that A will then have breached the contract
52 In the sexual assault context, translucency encourages victims to bring
claims by allowing them to keep their identities secret.  In the tort context, trans-
lucency discourages strategic suits while information about the substance of a
claim is shared for the benefit of third-party safety.
53 A similar set of strategies pertains to anti-bribery laws. See, e.g., OECD,
THE CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 44 (2011) (noting that in the
Philippines, an offer or solicitation of bribery constitutes attempted bribery, and
carries a significantly lower penalty than the full offense); see also id. at 43 (noting
that a number of Asia-Pacific countries carry lower penalties for offering rather
than receiving a bribe); OECD, THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY
247–48 (Mark Pieth, Lucinda A. Low & Peter J. Cullen eds., 2007) (noting the
same for a number of European countries).  In the United States, the Department
of Justice provides incentives for corporations to self-report any violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), trading a reduction in punishment for
cooperation with investigators. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division
Launches New FCPA Pilot Program, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARCHIVES (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/criminal-division-launches-new-fcpa-
pilot-program [https://perma.cc/G6H7-QCX7].  Reducing the penalty for self-re-
porting companies is crucial to the enforcement of anti-bribery laws.  In an OECD
study of 427 bribery cases, 31% were detected through self-reporting compared to
only 13% discovered by law enforcement. OECD, OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 15 (2014).
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with M and be required to forfeit the amount received from M as
specified in the confidentiality agreement.  This remedy is not
as powerful as it first seems because A does not usually gain
from disclosure.
A novel strategy to promote translucency (or transparency
for that matter) is to use the tax code.  Payments by businesses
can be allowed as deductible only if the substance or topic of
the settlement has been disclosed in accord with the policy of
translucency.  Note that it will be hard for parties to hide and
take deductions for large payments unless the settling claim-
ant is a vendor or other party to whom the firm might make
ordinary and necessary payments in the course of business.  In
principle, payments made under agreements that violate state
sunshine laws might in any event not be deductible under
federal law because tax law allows deductions only for ordinary
and necessary expenses and not for fines or illegal payments,
as determined by state (or local or federal) law.54  Thus, a deliv-
ery firm may reimburse its drivers for speeding tickets or even
for fines payable because they drove recklessly or under the
influence of alcohol, but these payments are nondeductible for
both the drivers and the firm.  Similarly, at least the premium
paid by M to A in return for confidentiality ought not to be
deductible by M, if the confidentiality violates sunshine laws or
the translucency standard suggested here.
Most extant sunshine laws, it should be noted, do not stop
at translucency; they aim for transparency where a defendant
has engaged in a pattern of wrongdoing that individual victims
have trouble discerning on their own.  They are also useful or
best understood as corrective deterrents aimed at cases where
a defendant, like M, believes that no one but the settling plain-
tiff, A, will see the connection A has made between the injury
and the defendant’s behavior.  M must also count on profes-
sional responsibility rules to prevent rather than require A’s
attorney from sharing information with other clients.55  At the
54 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(f) (2012) (“No deduction shall be allowed [as a business
expense] for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of
any law.”); id. at § 165(c) (noting that fines and penalties are not deductible as
“losses of individuals”).
55 But thus far the rules encourage settlement, and do not require an attor-
ney to do his or her best with respect to a subsequent client’s case. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or
unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client,”
which includes information learned during settlement negotiations); see, e.g.,
D.C. Bar, Eth. Op. 335 (2006) (advising that settlement provisions prohibit a
party’s lawyer from disclosing the amount and terms of the settlement); see also
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same time, we have suggested that M often has reason to fear
false claims by plaintiffs who might imitate A.  Mandatory
transparency, as required by some sunshine laws, likely goes
too far because news of A’s claim will bring forth claimants who
erroneously, irrationally, or strategically believe M injured
them.  M may already be optimally deterred, or justly and re-
tributively sanctioned, but now transparency generates fur-
ther, unsupported claims.  To the extent that they mandate full
disclosure, sunshine laws implicitly suppose that the social
benefits of additional lawsuits, which may or may not include
more payments to victims, exceed the costs of additional litiga-
tion and greater error in the legal system.  Translucency offers
a compromise between confidentiality and sunshine laws, and
the translucency proposal advanced here extends to agree-
ments beyond the reach of sunshine laws to payments made
before any claims are filed.  In fact, Texas’s sunshine law in-
structs courts not to seal documents, including pre-filing set-
tlement terms, where there is reason to guard against “any
probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety,” but specifically excludes “all reference
to any monetary consideration.”56  The Texas statute has re-
ceived attention because of the litigation it has spawned,
though the translucency feature seems unnoticed by courts
and commentators.57
Note that the enforcement tool offered by tax law allows
many interpersonal claims to go untouched, and this is fitting
because they are rarely indicative of patterns of wrongdoing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b), r. 1.9 (establishing a duty not to reveal
information relating to the representation of current and former clients).  Such
restrictions do not put the attorney in conflict with the duties owed to future
clients.  Note that, under these rules, a second client will be no better off going to
another unconflicted attorney.
56 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (2016).
57 See generally Robert C. Nissen, Open Court Records in Products Liability
Litigation Under Texas Rule 76a, 72 TEX. L. REV. 931 (1994) (examining the legisla-
tive history, structure, strengths, weaknesses, case law, and effect of Rule 76a).
Texas’s courts have held that settlement amounts are not the proper subject of
discovery. See Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tex. 1995). But
see In re Cont’l Ins. Co., 994 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tex. App. 1999) (permitting discov-
ery of settlement amounts when they may negate or offset insurance carrier’s
liability).  Courts and commentators seem to think it is unfair or unproductive to
force the disclosure of settlement amounts, because a subsequent settling plain-
tiff will take the prior settlement amount as a starting point, thus freeriding on it
after a fashion.  Perhaps no plaintiff will want to settle early. See Andrew D.
Miller, Comment, Federal Antisecrecy Legislation: A Model Act to Safeguard the
Public from Court-Sanctioned Hidden Hazards, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 371,
373–78 (1993) (suggesting that the secrecy of settlement agreement terms pre-
vents future plaintiffs from gaining an unfair advantage).
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Thus, when individuals D and E have a minor road accident,
and D is apparently at fault, small and even modest claims are
often settled without any notice given to the police or to either
driver’s insurer.58  D seeks to avoid higher insurance premi-
ums, inasmuch as drivers are experience rated, and may also
seek to avoid attention if there are outstanding arrest warrants
for D, if D is an undocumented immigrant, if D is driving with-
out a valid license, or if D is on a trip that D’s employer or
spouse would find objectionable.  In these cases, common intu-
itions track the argument in this Article.  Few people regard E
as immoral if E senses D’s reluctance and bargains for a
homespun remedy that gives E somewhat more money than it
will cost to repair E’s automobile.  The overcompensation de-
ters D in a manner that creates no moral hazard risk because E
cannot identify vulnerable drivers in advance.  Moreover, the
legal system shares in the savings associated with avoiding
trial.  D’s payments would not be deductible in any form, so it is
inconsequential but also untroubling to note that under the
proposal advanced here, D cannot deduct the payment to E.
There is, however, no logical connection between deduct-
ibility and translucency, and the former is simply one way of
encouraging the latter.  Law could try to penalize complete con-
fidentiality in a variety of ways, and it can encourage translu-
cency or transparency with direct rewards, as it does for
whistleblowers, or with indirect rewards, as it does when it
offers reductions in penalties or favorable plea bargains in re-
turn for cooperation in criminal cases.
B. Translucency for Misdemeanors
A useful comparison is to shoplifting.  Shopkeepers do not
always report those they have caught, but we have never heard
of a shoplifter and storekeeper agreeing to a payment beyond
restitution to settle the matter confidentially.59  It may be that
58 Most auto insurance contracts require immediate notification of all acci-
dents, but the remedy for breach is that the insurer can choose to terminate the
contract.  In most cases, the insurer does not know of the breach and, in any
event, if it wants to terminate the contract, it can usually find some reason to do
so.  Similarly, when the contract is renewed, or the insured moves to another
insurer, the new contract is entered into with the insurer unaware of the unre-
ported accident.  Substantial accidents involving personal injury, fatality, or prop-
erty damage of more than $1500 (in Illinois, for example) must by statute be
reported to the police. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-406(a) (2016).  The
threatened remedy for nondisclosure is that the state can suspend the non-
discloser’s driver’s license, but this is rare.
59 Homespun remedies are not unknown for other misdemeanors.  A young
vandal might agree to work in the victim’s store as a way of making amends, much
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the shopkeeper who does call in the police demonstrates a sort
of irrationality; the profit-maximizing strategy is probably to
free ride on other merchants and not to waste time reporting
and testifying.  Shopkeepers may fear that if they seek to ex-
tract payment, they will be accused as extortionists or robbers
who have exceeded their claims of right.  This is unfortunate; it
is plausible that something resembling a fine, payable to the
victim-reporter, is the best available deterrent.  The criminal
law system does not seem well-suited to misdemeanors when
the wrongdoer has limited means.  We would certainly advise
someone who was caught shoplifting and who risked arrest to
offer supercompensation, perhaps in the form of purchases in
the store, in return for a promise not to call the police.  Law’s
plausible goals seem better served by this remedy than by epi-
sodic processing in the formal legal system—and all the more
so where overreaction by the police is a social concern.  If confi-
dentiality in this case is troubling then, again, a kind of trans-
lucency seems superior; the shopkeeper reports the wrongdoer
in the interest of pattern recognition, and might even be re-
warded for doing so by law’s allowing a fraction of the penalty
payment to go unreported on the storekeeper’s tax return.  If
the shopkeeper demands a truly extortionary payment, the
shoplifter can always take his chances and refuse to pay,
knowing that the police might be called.  A central reporting
system might also be translucent in the sense that records
could be expunged after a specified period, because the pur-
pose of the record keeping is to allow future victims (and the
legal authorities) to react differently if the wrongdoer they face
is a serial criminal of the sort best handled not through private
apology, restitution, and rehabilitation, but through profes-
sional monitoring and punishment.
We have already discussed the possibility and danger of
confidentiality agreements with respect to more serious crimi-
nal wrongdoing, where in the absence of a bargain the victim is
quite likely to call the police.  If there are settings where confi-
dentiality agreements are imaginable, as was arguably the case
regarding the embezzler discussed in Part III, law might decide
that translucency is the superior rule.  It allows the employer to
deter the embezzler with a financial incentive, but would also
as deadbeats of yesteryear stayed to wash dishes in the restaurant’s kitchen.
Monetary payments, however, are rare.  We can find no sign of a shopkeeper
announcing ex ante that shoplifters who are apprehended by the store’s security
guards will be required to pay a multiple of the value of anything taken—or the
police will be called.
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allow the state to gather useful information and protect others
from a serial wrongdoer.  Law could encourage partial reporting
by guaranteeing a kind of transactional immunity, providing
that information about confidential settlements will not be
used to pursue wrongdoers, or at least not one who was party
to the agreement.
C. The Translucency Ideal
Assume, then, a rule of translucency requiring A and M to
disclose only the precise subject matter of their agreement,
which will often be a restatement of the legal claim filed by A.
As discussed, M might be motivated by a variety of induce-
ments, including the prospect of deducting payments made to
A.60  Think, for example, of claims that the prescription medi-
cation Viagra causes blindness by restricting blood supply to
the optic nerve.  If A and M (in this case, Pfizer) settle a claim,
the disclosure might be: “The claim filed by A against M for
damages, in the form of loss of sight, that A believes he suffered
as a result of taking Viagra, has been settled.  The parties have
agreed not to discuss the terms of settlement.”  Potential claim-
ants can see the connection A has made between his injury and
M’s behavior, and they are free to follow or conduct further
research on the matter.  Pfizer is free to point out that the few
men who developed blindness had diabetes or other preexisting
conditions, so that it is hardly clear that Viagra has this dan-
gerous side effect.  Moreover, consumers who contemplate us-
ing Viagra, whether by prescription or in the active
aftermarket, might rethink the matter and avoid the drug.
Translucency as expressed through a neutral and searchable
website provides more information than these users could have
obtained from newspaper stories or the initial filing of lawsuits
alone.  They now know that Viagra’s manufacturer paid at least
a modest settlement to one plaintiff.  Other plaintiffs may also
60 The notion of encouraging settlements but requiring some information for
third parties could be advanced by allowing the parties to secret only the amounts
of large settlements, whether pre- or post-filing, such as those exceeding $10,000.
This exemption serves to lower administrative costs.  Under current law, while the
application of sunshine laws varies by state, even broadly construed sunshine
laws often require a weighing of the parties’ interests and the public interest, thus
limiting their application to larger claims that can be said to affect the public as a
whole. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(4)(b) (West 2017) (requiring
that when determining whether information surrounding product liability suits
should be divulged to the public, a “court shall balance the right of the public to
information regarding the alleged risk to the public from the product or sub-
stance . . . against the right of the public to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion” with trade secrets.).
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have received settlements and simply decided to keep their
medical condition, performance anxiety, or newly acquired
wealth private.  A confidentiality agreement would have re-
quired filing in order to be enforceable.  Note, in passing, that
neither transparency nor translucency need go so far as to
sacrifice a plaintiff’s reasonable preference for privacy.  Most of
A’s identifying characteristics are of little interest to other
parties.
In all of these cases, the fact of settlement and the nature
of the underlying claim provide different information than does
the amount of settlement.  If B learns that A extracted a settle-
ment from M far in excess of what might be expected from the
injuries A is known to have suffered, then B is on notice that M
is paying to keep people like B from coming forward.  M seeks
to avoid numerous trials and reputational loss.  On the other
hand, if B knows only that M has paid some nontrivial amount
to A, B has useful information about the likelihood that his own
injuries are connected to M’s behavior in a way that might
make litigation or negotiation worthwhile.  M might only have
compensated A, or paid a fraction of A’s actual losses.  The
point is that knowledge of the substance of A’s settlement with
M may help B discover the cause of his own injury and facilitate
a payment from M.  But knowledge of the amount of the A-M
settlement probably adds less socially useful information than
it encourages strategic suits and wasteful litigation.  Much de-
pends on the nature of M’s business and the variety of its
products and services.  In some cases, disclosure of the settle-
ment amount would be more useful to B than disclosure of the
substance of the A-M settlement.  In other cases, the reverse is
true.  In both cases, the less that is revealed to B and to others,
the greater the expected (confidential or translucent) payment
to A.  This payment serves as a deterrent.  Plaintiffs like B have
private information about their own claims, including medical
costs, property losses, and emotional losses, and these do not
depend on the wrongdoers’ settlements with prior plaintiffs.  If
A underestimates the connection between M and other victims,
or otherwise fails to drive a hard bargain, M can purchase
silence from A for less than its full deterrent value.  Translu-
cency drives up the costs of settlement, whether A underesti-
mates its value or not, and can deter M ex ante or provide
compensation to individual victims ex post.61
61 A further distinction is that secrecy can encourage multiple plaintiffs to
search for valuable settlements in a way that is wastefully duplicative and can
encourage M to take socially inefficient precautions.  A may be able to discern
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Still, there are cases where complete confidentiality or
complete transparency is preferable to translucency.  The sim-
plest of these cases is where even modest disclosure is expected
to unleash so many strategic or misguided lawsuits that M is
induced to take precautions, including product recalls, that are
in fact socially inefficient.  M may now be induced to recall a
product in order to prevent further injuries and lawsuits that
would arise only because of the disclosure.62  M calculates that
the cost of additional care is worthwhile simply to reduce its
litigation costs; M would have preferred to pay for confidential-
ity in order to discourage baseless but costly lawsuits, and
confidentiality would have been socially efficient.  At the other
extreme are cases where anything less than full disclosure pro-
tects M from socially efficient suits, and encourages M not to
take socially efficient precautions to prevent further injuries.
The inefficiency can also be of the ex ante kind; the inability to
enter into binding and complete confidentiality agreements
might cause M to take greater but inefficient precautions at the
outset.  In contrary cases, the prospect of secreting some infor-
mation causes M to take insufficient precautions at the outset.
The central idea is that confidentiality, translucency, and
transparency may each have their moments, but law must or-
dinarily choose a rule, or at least assign one rule to types of
cases as the sunshine laws have sought to do.  This Article has
suggested that the deterrence power of payments for confiden-
tiality is underappreciated, so that a move away from the trans-
parency of sunshine laws to something a little more respectful
of private bargains is worth trying.  Translucency is a compro-
mise that aims to deter defendants with higher settlements but
provide enough disclosure to encourage socially efficient pre-
caution-taking as well as fewer wasteful, strategic claims.
Translucency (or even full transparency) is easiest to de-
fend where it helps reveal a pattern of misbehavior, as observed
in the claim against the serial sexual assaulter, and as is likely
to be the case in many discrimination claims.  Employees who
have suffered discrimination, like victims of sexual assault and
harassment, may perceive that it is costly to bring claims.  If,
however, they can easily learn not only of the existence of other
some of the value of secrecy to M, but not its full amount.  To the extent that
translucency reveals the true value of secrecy, duplicative search costs for ineffi-
cient confidential settlements are reduced.
62 If the assumption about M’s behavior is correct, then a recall or other
precaution is socially inefficient and undertaken simply to prevent baseless law-
suits.  If M’s behavior is imperfect, then disclosure of the substance of the settle-
ment might stimulate desirable precautions.
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claims but also of their settlement for nontrivial sums, they
may come forward in search of similar compensation, and help
reveal a pattern of wrongdoing.63
The more the law requires disclosure, the fewer settle-
ments there will be, and in civil cases—unlike the criminal
context—the longstanding policy appears to be in favor of set-
tlement rather than in favor of reporting to law enforcement
authorities.  If law wanted to discourage confidential agree-
ments, it could make the payments by M nondeductible; pay-
ments that arise out of tort suits or in settlement of these suits
are generally deductible because they substitute for (deducti-
ble) precaution costs rather than for fines or other penalties
where the aim is to discourage the underlying behavior en-
tirely.  This tax treatment would discourage settlement be-
cause, on the margin, M knows that transparency followed by
other suits that will settle or go to trial generate costs, but
deductible costs.
VI
TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL: PATTERNS, PRIVACY, AND
ADJUDICATION ACCURACY
As we have seen, the beneficial effects of permissible se-
crecy depend on context.  This Article has identified specific
cases where law should prefer translucency, transparency, or
secrecy; we now offer a general framework that incorporates
these examples and facilitates analysis of new cases.
Consider a policymaker who wishes to maximize the social
value of settlements.  There are four categories of benefits and
costs: (1) the deterrence value of settlement—which must al-
ways be compared to the deterrence value of trials and judg-
ments; (2) the related value of plaintiffs’ incentives to bring
claims; (3) the cost of false claims; and (4) the cost of adminis-
tering law.  Note that the social value of deterrence is analyti-
cally identical to the concept of efficient precautions in tort law.
63 Imagine a claim for back wages by an employee who claims that the dis-
criminatory practice of her employer prevented her promotion and higher earn-
ings.  These higher earnings would have been deductible to the employer as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.  In turn, payment in settlement of the
claim, or payment as the result of a judgment, would also be deductible.  Now
assume that law requires translucency or more.  One way to encourage compli-
ance is to refuse to enforce confidentiality agreements that are not disclosed as
required.  Defendants would pay less because they would know that a settling
employee who breached the agreement would not be required by law to return the
settlement amount.  The text suggests that another means of discouraging confi-
dentiality would be to disallow deductions for payments made following undis-
closed agreements.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 41 24-JAN-18 10:54
2018] SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS 351
An efficiency-minded policymaker seeks to minimize the total
cost of accidents.  Precautions are encouraged with liability
rules, but only when they are cost-justified.  Similarly, the poli-
cymaker should require (or not require) disclosure of settle-
ments so as to minimize the cost of antisocial behavior,
including litigation, settlement, and administrative costs.  Dis-
closure is costly, so it should be required only when cost-justi-
fied.  It creates benefits (by deterring antisocial behavior) and
costs (by chilling legitimate claims and encouraging false ones).
Thus, parametric assumptions must be made in order to reach
a conclusion about the value of a particular sunshine regime.
This decision is simplified somewhat by the observation, dis-
cussed in subpart I.B and Part IV, that disclosure creates
greater deterrence benefits when it reveals a pattern of antiso-
cial behavior.  In turn, pattern recognition encourages legiti-
mate claims because it reduces private discovery costs.
Victims can more easily identify wrongdoers and bring viable
claims.  Law must be on guard against false claimants, but the
more there is a pattern of wrongdoing, and liability is difficult
to assess, the more costly is secrecy of settlement between the
wrongdoer and a victim.
When wrongdoing is episodic and not a predictor of future
wrongdoing, transparent or translucent sunshine laws are of
little value; if a defendant pays for confidentiality, it is because
the defendant fears false claims or some reputational loss.  The
other two categories of benefits and costs fall out of the picture
because, by hypothesis, the wrongdoing is a one-off event.64  If
the defendant pays handsomely for a confidential settlement,
the payment itself provides a substantial deterrent.  Without a
pattern, legitimate follow-on claims cannot be chilled by se-
crecy because victims’ ability to discern wrongdoing remains
unchanged.  On the other hand, public settlement may en-
courage strike suits to the extent that opportunistic plaintiffs
are able to discern the settlement behavior of defendants.  In
legal domains that do not exhibit patterns of wrongdoing, law
should therefore accommodate the parties’ bargain for secrecy.
This is especially so where the costs of administering law are
high inasmuch as disclosure can encourage more lawsuits.
64 Plaintiffs who value privacy in episodic claims still retain bargaining power
to adequately deter defendants who value their reputation and fear litigation.
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 Deterrence P Incentive False Claims Admin. Costs Key Examples 
Secrecy   
Pattern Y Low Sufficient Low Low AR-S, Em-S,  
Generic A-M, X-Y 
Pattern N High Sufficient Low Low
   
Privacy H High Sufficient Low Low
Privacy L High Sufficient Low Low
   
Adj. Acc. H High Sufficient Low Low
Adj. Acc. L Lower Indeterminate Indeterminate Low
   
Transparency   
Pattern Y High Sufficient High Higher A-M
Pattern N High Sufficient Low Higher
   
Privacy H High Insufficient High Higher X-Y
Privacy L High Sufficient Low Higher
   
Adj. Acc. H High Sufficient Low Higher
Adj. Acc. L Low Indeterminate Indeterminate Higher
   
Translucency   
Pattern Y High Sufficient Low Lower A-M
Pattern N High Sufficient Low Lower
   
Privacy H High Sufficient Low Lower Em-S. X-Y 
Privacy L High Sufficient Low Lower
   
Adj. Acc. H High Sufficient Low Higher
Adj. Acc. L Low Indeterminate Indeterminate Higher
FIG. 1: THE EFFECTS OF PATTERNS, PRIVACY, AND ADJUDICATION
ACCURACY (ADJ. ACC.) ACROSS DISCLOSURE REGIMES.
Inferior outcomes in bold.65
The discussion in Part IV explained why pattern revelation
in sexual assault cases is important for deterrence, but man-
dated disclosure in those cases may chill claims or lead to
insufficient settlements that do little to deter wrongdoers.  Our
analysis suggests that a second parametric assumption is re-
quired for evaluating sunshine laws, that is, parties’ valuation
of privacy.  When this value is high, and pattern recognition
matters, a translucent approach that protects plaintiff’s pri-
vacy leads to optimal deterrence.  This is because translucency
encourages victims to bring claims.  Similarly, when the cost of
65 AR-S and EM-S refer to the armed robber- and embezzler-storekeeper
examples, discussed supra Part II; A-M refers to the consumer-manufacturer
example, discussed supra subpart I.A; X-Y refers to the sexual assault example,
discussed supra Part IV.
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false claims is high (and pattern recognition matters), a trans-
lucent approach that partially protects defendant privacy max-
imizes the social value of settlements.66  Disclosure of the
claim’s subject matter, and not its amount, reveals a pattern of
wrongdoing that reduces private discovery costs but dampens
plaintiff incentives to file non-viable claims.  In particular,
these incentives are reduced because less information is re-
vealed about a defendant’s settlement behavior than in a re-
gime requiring transparency.  Note that disclosure of the
amount but not the subject of the claim would reveal less about
patterned wrongdoing and more about settlement behavior.
Disclosure of the number of claims, but not their subject mat-
ter or dollar amount, would produce the same inferior result.
Plaintiffs’ capacity to assess defendants’ exposure to liabil-
ity, and thus drive a bargain that properly deters defendants, is
the driving force in the argument for confidential settlement as
deterrent.  When that capacity is high, victims have less need
for disclosure of prior settlements.  Law can rely on settlements
to deter wrongdoers, and law can enjoy lower administrative
costs.  A heightened ability to assess wrongdoing is thus an
exception to the general result that where there is serial (or
patterned) wrongdoing, law should disfavor secret settle-
ments.67  Still, as discussed in Part II, this optimistic conclu-
sion requires that there be at least one victim who perceives the
number of other victims and the extent of their injuries.  Such a
victim can extract a settlement that sufficiently deters the de-
fendant.  In the absence of an effective plaintiff of this sort, a
wrongdoer is properly deterred only by multiple claims, or a
class action, so that sunshine (on settlements) is desirable.
Again, if the plaintiffs value privacy, translucency may be supe-
rior to transparency.
In addition to patterns and privacy, a third and final pa-
rameter is adjudication accuracy.  When facts are difficult to
discern, administrative costs are high.68  In turn, (1) deterrence
66 We recognize that some case types may require an assumption that victim
privacy is more socially valuable than injurer privacy.  This is particularly so when
the social benefits of deterrence exceed the social costs of false claims.  The
opposite is true when the competing quantities of both statements are reversed.
67 While a more general approach would dispose of pattern recognition alto-
gether and consider plaintiffs’ ability to assess exposure in its stead, we think that
the specificity gained through the discussion of patterns is analytically valuable.
See supra subpart I.B.
68 Where laws are difficult to discern and adjudication may, over time, pro-
duce accurate judgment, parties are likely to choose litigation. See George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 67–68 (1977).
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is weak because parties are uncertain of legal outcomes; (2)
plaintiffs can be chilled by high discovery costs—unless they
perceive that defendants’ costs are even greater; and (3) false
claims will rise as plaintiffs play the litigation lottery, though
the increase is offset somewhat by burdens and standards of
proof.  Unsurprisingly, this is the setting where private settle-
ment is most beneficial, as it can provide deterrence at a lower
cost than litigation, and in situations where litigation may fail
to provide any deterrence at all.  In turn, permissive confidenti-
ality encourages these desirable settlements.  A legal system
that is accurate and efficient has little need for settlements, but
as costs and inaccuracy rise, private settlement is attractive—
and especially so once it is understood that the settling plaintiff
can extract value in return for confidentiality, and thus con-
tribute to law’s deterrence goal.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by asking whether there is a problem
with confidential settlements of civil lawsuits.  The answer is
nuanced—as it is for criminal and sexual assault cases—be-
cause each type of disclosure regime generates its own mix of
identifiable benefits and costs.  The plain observation that set-
tlements reduce the cost of administering law provides a de-
fault regime of permissible secrecy, and has surely encouraged
courts to favor settlement and therefore to allow confidentiality
at the expense of third parties.  Disclosure is most important
when there is a pattern of wrongdoing that a settling plaintiff
cannot assess.  When a plaintiff’s incentive to file is low and a
false claimant’s incentive to file is high, disclosure must be
tempered with privacy protections that encourage legitimate
claims and discourage false ones.  On the other hand, deter-
rence may benefit from secrecy when the facts of a dispute are
obscure and courts cannot adjudicate claims accurately.
The title of this Article is misleading, as it describes the
back half of our discussion, aimed at readers who reject our
first claim: that confidential settlements may be desirable be-
cause the price of confidentiality is a payment that promotes
law’s deterrence goals.  In many cases, including most that
involve tortfeasors and their victims (whether in a potential
large-scale tort or in a two-party road accident), the strong
intuition in favor of—and legislated sunshine laws requiring—
disclosure aimed to benefit third parties is likely wrong.  Law-
yers like disclosure and the signals that it provides, but lawyers
are professionally inclined to underestimate the costs and dis-
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taste most people associate with trials.  They are also inclined
to think that legal procedures get at the truth, while laypeople
are often fearful of legal errors, and thus eager to settle cases in
ways that will bring on few others.
This Article has not insisted that by paying a premium for
confidential settlements, wrongdoers are optimally deterred.
Indeed, it has explained why the deterrence is imperfect.  But
even this imperfect deterrence is enough to suggest that law
ought to be nudged away from transparency and toward trans-
lucency.  This is clearest in civil cases where law and judicial
behavior reflect a strong policy in favor of settlement.  In crimi-
nal and university discipline cases, where there is no such
policy, where a pattern of misbehavior might be hidden by con-
fidentiality, and where the law might have reason for its reme-
dies and not want private parties to convert them to cash, there
are few cases where confidential settlement is warranted.
